…sieht Brad DeLong die Situation von Bear Stearns auch so wie ich. Und, hurra, die Börse wohl auch:

Die JP-Morgan-Aktie ist mit einem Plus von mehr als acht Prozent das einzige Papier im Dow-Jones-30-Index, das ein ansehnliches Plus zu verzeichnen hat.

Und Megan McArdle hält die Rettungsaktion ebenfalls für angemessen:

Libertarians and liberals arguing against the Fed’s role in all this sound to me either ignorant or psychotic. The credit markets are already badly malfunctioning (yes, I was wrong). Bear Stearns is the counterparty to a huge number of transactions. Allowing it to fail would have been like throwing a hand grenade into a burning pool of gasoline; bankruptcy proceedings are time-consuming and uncertain. JP Morgan has the ability to assume their risks without any danger of going under themselves; that’s very good for the markets, and by extension, us.

Willem Buiter hätte den Laden lieber verstaatlicht.

Beim WSJ weist man nochmal darauf hin, daß die Fed bei Bear Stearns eigentlich nur das tat, wofür man sie gegründet hat:

The Fed was created in 1913 in part to be “lender of last resort” during crises such as the one now sweeping through the financial system. But it was equipped for an economy in which banks provided most credit. Now banks share that role with institutional investors, finance companies, asset-backed pools and securities dealers such as Bear Stearns.

Außerdem sei der Bailout für Bear Stearns so gestaltet worden, daß moral hazard kein wirkliches Problem sei — denn die Eigentümer hätten beim vereinbarten Kaufpreis ja herzlich wenig davon:

The funding is structured so that the greater benefit is to those who lent money to Bear Stearns in the “repo” market for secured, overnight loans, not to Bear Stearns itself. Moreover, they note it’s unlikely any firm will consider the loss Bear Stearns’s shareholders are likely to sustain as an acceptable price for taking the same risks in hopes of a bailout.

Und zum Schluß noch ein Wort vom Economist an Apokalyptiker und Finanzmarkt-Racheengel:

A salient point in this case is whether the potential future threat of risk taking encouraged by Fed bailouts is likely to be more costly than Bear’s bankruptcy. Disagreements persist about the systemic importance of Bear, but there can be no question that the uncertainty over the question and the fragility of global financial markets forced the Fed to move; the alternative was too unpalatable. The notion of helping the careless rich with their self-generated problems may be unsavoury, but the financial crisis is not taking place in a bubble separate from economic activity generally. We should not cut off our nose to spite our face.

Eben. Wie dort unten schon geschrieben: Natürlich kollidiert es mit jedermanns Gerechtigkeitsempfinden, Ferrarifahrern ein Bailout zu geben. Aber ist Rechthaberei eine deutlich verschärfte Rezession wert? Doch wohl eher nicht.